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For instance, negotiators necessarily make decisions about the 
process they will use and the posture they will adopt to satisfy their needs, 
and those decisions will reflect personal values involving moral issues 
such as fairness, rights and justice. Similarly, parties rarely have full 
information about each other, and so they may be in a position to take 
advantage of a perceived deficiency, or to present information that may 
not be true. [NDR: Hinshaw, Ethics] They may also agree to a settlement 
that affects third parties-for example, they could externalize costs by 
putting them on some entity not present at the negotiation. [NDR: 
Wade-Benzoni, Future Generations] And there may be obvious opportu-
nities to exploit someone's ignorance or lack of power. 
This chapter outlines three major ways that we can think about the 
morality of negotiation. First, the moral stance of the parties themselves 
should be taken into account. Second, ~e should note that individuals 
may approach negotiation along a spectrum from cooperation to zero-
sum competition, and consequently we have to acknowledge the impor-
tance of the value-laden issues involved, such as trust, disclosure, or 
beneficence. Finally, we should recognize that private deal making is 
sanctioned against a societal backdrop that currently (at least in the U.S.) 
gives a lot oflatitude to agreements as long as they are not unconsciona-
ble. Hence we ought to be aware of the way negotiation fits into the wider 
social and political context of justice, rights, equality, or welfare. [NDR: 
Welsh, Fairness] 
Morality encompasses value-based decisions and behavior. Although 
the term ethics is formally the practice of critical assessment of morality, 
it is commonly used to describe behavior in defined roles or circum-
stances. For example, we could discuss the ethics of poker, where those 
playing the game acknowledge the specific rules and behavior involved. 
Given the nature of the game, bluffing and lying are allowed, and even 
become routine and expected ploys that take advantage of the opponents' 
ignorance. At the same time, other behaviors are prohibited: it is unac-
ceptable to play with marked cards or a confederate. This distinction is 
important, since some negotiators will consider their personal behavior 
to be compartmentalized into distinct spheres where they separate their 
everyday behavior from what they consider acceptable in a bargaining 
situation, especially if they are acting as a paid agent for a third party. 
There is considerable literature that treats negotiation as an amoral 
game, where ethical concerns do not stand in the way of substantive 
gains. 1 In a similar vein other writers have advocated that the only 
constraint on an attorney's behavior in negotiation should be its legality. 2 
Given the prevalence of such approaches it is worthwhile to be aware of 
the nature of the techniques involved and the dynamics they set up. 
[NDR: Craver, Distributive Negotiation] Clearly, the aim in most of these 
tricks of the trade is to give one party an advantage in bargaining. Such 
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tactics, however, risk putting one's credibility at risk and limiting the 
prospect of future interaction. 3 Although the aggression and competition 
of gamesmanship may lead to short-term gains, it put reputation at risk.4 
[NDR: Tinsley et al., Reputation] The evidence is that any immediate 
benefit will typically be negated by the inefficiencies imposed by distrust 
and the opportunity costs of foregone future transactions. 5 
An intermediate view would accept that while we initially make moral 
decisions about the roles we adopt, such as an attorney or doctor, subse-
quently our duties are not personal, but instead are governed by the 
appropriate professional codes (Lyons 1984; Fuller 1965; Kadish and 
Kadish 1973). Nevertheless we should note that professional codes are not 
comprehensive algorithms that cover all contingencies, and in fact they 
allow considerable latitude for discretionary behavior. For example, 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, settlement discussions may not be 
used in future litigation. At the same time, participants may not have to 
tell the truth in those discussions, or even bargain in good faith. 
Moreover, while the law provides a useful threshold, there are a 
number of problems associated with using it as a moral yardstick that 
would guide all our actions. The law is largely a reactive instrument that 
responds to challenges, and it is incapable of legislating every possible 
case. New and different issues not covered by settled law would constantly 
be contested and demand interpretation. We might imagine what the 
world would be like if dependence on the law were the prevailing attitude. 
Against a background where people are constantly wary that others are 
predatory, and feel they only have to fulfill legal obligations but nothing 
more, everyone would become dependent on armies of monitors, enforc-
ers, jurists and punishers. In contrast, however, it turns out that in the 
real world most people operate in an everyday environment of trust and 
credibility that makes sharp dealing dramatically conspicuous and 
jarring. [NDR: Lewicki, Trust] 
Accordingly, let us now consider the other sense of ethics, which is 
not so much a set of rules for a specific enterprise as a broad framework 
for critically assessing moral ideas of right and wrong, good and bad, 
fairness, and justice. 
The Value of Ethical Theory 
Traditionally philosophical ethics fall into three major camps: conse- . 
quentialism, deontology, and virtue theory. 
Consequentialism, as the name suggests, finds the moral locus of an 
issue in its results. One way to do this is to assess the balance among 
utility functions involved, and so one form of this camp is called utilitari-
anism. Moral worth is then judged on the overall happiness created, or 
good, of an action, sometimes with the watchword that we should maxi-
mize good for the maximum number. There are also variations that 
\ 
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suggest we all do well in the long run by cooperating, and hence the 
concern for others may anticipate reciprocation or other payoffs for the 
individual.6 Apparent altruistic acts such as donating blood are inter-
preted in terms of greater psychological welfare for the donors, or strate-
gic self-interest since one day the individual may derive personal benefit 
from the arrangement. 
A contemporary version of utilitarianism is known as preference 
maximization, associated with the work of Herbert Simon. Instead of 
looking to maximize happiness or pleasure in general, it seeks to find 
acceptable options and "satisfice" as many individual preferences as 
possible (Simon 1956). Doing so addresses difficulties in calculating 
varying personal utility functions while still seeking to increase overall 
aggregate welfare. 
Deontology gets its name from the Greek word for duty, as it looks to 
motives and obligations rather than seeking any particular outcome, and 
is sometimes described in terms of the golden rule; do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you. It reflects a belief that we should always do 
the right thing for the sake of goodness alone, without regard for any 
potential reward (Fisher et. al. 1994). Thus, promises should be kept and 
obligations met simply because they are duties which should not be 
compromised because of inconvenience or greater benefits elsewhere. 
Specifically, it treats individuals as autonomous moral actors, each 
capable of judging right from wrong. In any particular case, deontologists 
believe our behavior should not be a function of the probability and 
gravity of anticipated results, such as a lie being discovered, but instead 
we should always be able to justify our actions whatever the outcome 
turns out to be. Additionally, as the theory is based on individual auton-
omy, it implies that all people should be treated with respect and not just 
as an instrument in the other party's aggrandizement. 
The third approach, virtue theory, differs in that it avoids providing 
an ethical formula by looking either to aggregate welfare or to how 
everyone ought to be treated in similar circumstances. Derived from the 
work of Aristotle, this approach looks instead to the purposive arc of our 
lives. It encourages us to think how we should develop a value-driven life 
that allows for maximum personal flourishing. Rather than focusing on 
specific acts, it suggests that what matters most is making the most of our 
personal virtues to form a robust character. In short, it asks what sort of 
person we want to be, what it means to have a life well lived, and what 
virtues we should foster to avoid regret when we look back on our lives. 
Sometimes it has been linked with the motto moderation in all things, 
but this could be misleading. The theory says we all have a package of 
virtues such as courage, generosity, compassion and so forth, but that 
these have to be applied in a specific context with the practical wisdom of 
experience. There are times when we should be more angry, or more 
1~----------------------------------------------------
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trusting. The key is to apply them at the right time for the right reasons 
and in the right way: moderation in this sense seems more akin to 
navigating a ship through a rocky passage by judicious use of the appro-
priate adjustments than to tamping down all our moral reactions. Fur-
ther, virtue theory looks to character models, and allows us to step back 
and ask how our heroes and champions would behave in similar circum-
stances. 
These varied ethical approaches should not be thought of as exclusive 
or exhaustive, and in most cases they support common conclusions. For 
example, they would all condemn slavery or oppression, but on different 
grounds. The fact that they provide contesting perspectives should not be 
considered a drawback: they serve as first principles for ethical discourse 
that make plain the foundational assumptions involved, and each in its 
way provides theoretical underpinning for subsequent argument and 
policy development. 
Moreover, ethical foundations also serve to arrest the notion of 
ethical relativism. Relativism suggests that ethical choice is no more than r-
expressed preference, much like choosing one flavor of ice cream over 
another. Because there are so many views of correct behavior, this 
argument goes, no single theory is correct-with the implication that the 
search for ethical standards is specious from the start. An analogy might 
be useful to counter the claim: the fact that there are many different 
religions does not by itself argue that the quest for spiritual truth is 
pointless, but rather speaks to the fact that there is a common yearning 
that is manifested in a wide variety of forms. Similarly, the fact that there 
are differing bases for ethical theory cannot support the argument that 
there are no universal moral standards. In fact, the congruence of their 
conclusions suggests some common ground in human interaction, and a 
basis for subsequent rational argument. Perhaps a better way to think of 
the theories is not as competing approaches but more as tools in a toolbox 
which may be called on in varying kinds of justification. 
Ethics Awareness in Negotiation 
A worthwhile starting point in discussions about the ethics of negotiation 
is to determine what individuals believe the aim of negotiation is, and 
what they feel are the proper means to achieve it. For instance, some may 
feel that negotiation is a contest where the object is to win at the expense 
of another, with the implication that any compromise would be a sign of 
weakness. Others might align more closely with the belief that each party 
will naturally seek mutually beneficial outcomes. Such core assumptions 
will naturally govern the subsequent behavior of the parties. 
In iterated prisoner dilemma games, for example, it is often profit-
able-at first-for parties to lie or betray each other. Some people will not 
feel constrained by concerns about lying or defection. In contrast, empiri-
/ 
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cal work shows that some participants will prefer to retain a sense of 
ethical self-worth rather than compromise their values for instant gain 
(Murnighan 1992). Testing based on person-ality types found that 
cooperative people believe there are cooperative, neutral, and competitive 
people in the world; people with a more neutral disposition felt there were 
neutral and competitive sorts; and competitive individuals felt that 
everyone was exclusively competitive too (Kelly and Stahelski 1970 ). The 
result is that individuals who impute values to others may unnecessarily 
constrain bargaining styles and lose opportunities for settlements. In 
addition, competitive behavior in these tests was also associated with 
aggressive behavior characterized by selective misrepresentation and 
willingness to renege on agreements.7 It also appears that an aggressor 
will push the other side as far as it will go, in the belief that the opponent 
will speak up if negotiations go over the boundary of moral acceptability. 
In that sense, they do not self-monitor their behavior, but rather rely on 
their opponents to restrain them, a stance that may leave other parties 
feeling "steamrollered" (Kelly and Stahelski 1970). Some negotiation 
exercises may foster self-consciousness about individual negotiation 
styles and our perceptions of others, and it has been found that reassess-
ing personal values is useful in developing a greater repertoire of poten-
tial actions and responses (Mannix, Tinsley and Bazerman 1995). 
Present Directions in Ethics 
The emergence of ethics awareness and training might be viewed as an 
expanding circle. Where originally it dealt mainly with compliance and 
avoiding sanctions, modern ethics discussion has moved to looking at 
issues in a far wider and more comprehensive context (Singer 1981). It is 
also significant that ethics has become less of a purely intellectual exer-
cise, and now normative issues are often explored in association with 
findings of social science, economics, and psychology. 
The expansion of ethical consideration to the welfare of others has 
sometimes been referred to as plus-one staging (Schmidt and Davison 
1983). Lawrence Kohlberg developed a well-known set of moral levels. 
They move from the pre-conventional, where moral reasoning revolves 
around the physical consequences of action in terms of punishment and 
reward, to the conventional level, where conformity to social order takes 
priority in order to fit in with prevailing norms. He then describes the 
post-conventional, which focuses on principled reasoning in which the 
subject is motivated by moral values and principles with a concern for 
universality and consistency (Kohlberg and Kramer 1969). Kohlberg's 
research suggests that most people are in the conventional level, and 
plus-one staging challenges individuals to assess their own moral devel-
opment and think at higher levels with a wider perspective about what 
they should do. In negotiation theory we often begin by making sure that 
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a participant's actions will not lead to punishment by poor performance 
or breaching the law, and then move on to exploring how we think an 
ideal negotiator might behave. Using the Kohl berg model, some negotia-
tion trainers encourage personal reflection and moral development. 
Kohlberg's work has been supplemented by Carol Gilligan's insights 
(Gilligan 1982). Gilligan noted that oftentimes women confronted with 
moral dilemmas thought about them differently from men-roughly, they 
were more concerned about relationships between individuals and about 
why the dilemma arose in the first place. It is not surprising, then, that in 
general women may deal with moral concerns, conflict, and negotiation 
in ways that have not traditionally been explored in the classroom. There 
is a growing literature both in ethical theory and negotiation that chal-
lenges the established male-defined template of correct action (Kolb and 
Williams 2003; Kolb and Williams 2000; Babcock and Laschever 2003; 
Jaggar and Young 1998; Pearsal1993). [NDR: Bear & Babcock, Gender] 
One manifestation of the wider realm of moral concern is the more 
frequent use of stakeholder analysis. Stakeholders are people or institu-
tions that will be helped or harmed in some way by change, and perhaps 
ought to be considered at the bargaining table even if they are not repre-
sented.8 [NDR: Amsler, Systems Design] 
Post-modernist ethics go beyond individual actions to the much 
broader canvas of society as a whole. They propose that we need to look 
at the world as a set of perceived narratives, and, consequently, we would 
think of negotiation not so much as an exposition of positions and 
interests, but as a larger story that examines which narrative comes to 
dominate the discourse (Cobb and Rifkin 1991). Research indicates that 
when inexperienced or untrained individuals negotiate, settlements 
emerge out of the initial narrative almost eighty percent of the time, 
which means there is immense power in being the first to make a case. As 
Cobb and Rifkin note, justice issues should cover more than substantive 
or procedural guidelines, and spill over into "a question of access, of 
participation in the construction of dominant descriptions and stories" 
(Cobb and Rifkin 1991: 62). Consequently the framing effects of different 
articulations of the same facts are likely to affect our moral judgments 
(Bazerman 1984). 
The upshot is that ethics in negotiation should be expanded signifi-
cantly to consider the whole context in which the negotiation is set and 
the way the parties' interpretations are presented, contested, trans-
formed, and finally settled upon in terms of what would be most just, fair, 
or appropriate. For example, two insurance adjusters may share the same 
worldview and agree on the terms of a settlement, but if we think of a 
struggling working-class tenant and wealthy landlord, the differences we 
find may not just be one of positions and interests, but the very way in 
which they live and make sense of the world. 
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Another development at the very core of ethics deserves to be high~ 
lighted. Traditionally there have been well-established theories of human. 
nature; these have lately come under increasing scrutiny. Although the 
analogy is not strict, animal studies indicate that, for instance, monkey 
populations are basically cooperative and spend significant time in. 
reconciliation (De Waal1989; Colman 1982). A result ofthis research is 
that long-held assumptions that all animals, including humans, are 
aggressive and competitive are no longer taken for granted. Similarly, 
from the time of Aristotle, one of the chief distinguishing features of being 
human has been considered to be our rational intellectual ability. Yet 
some philosophers suggest that our initial relationships are not rational 
but instead emotional and compassionate. [NDR: O'Shea, Compassionj 
Our first formative experiences are not rule-governed, but begin with 
emotional bonding, such as the connection between mother and child. 
Consequently much of recent ethics research has explored the normative 
implications of changing our basic assumptions about human interaction. 
In time, this may lead to a very different template for interpersonal 
behavior (Noddings 2003). 
Conclusion 
Morality is a function of our values. Some values are trivial; some can be 
traded; and some, like faith, honor, and loyalty, sustain our identity. 
Quite literally, history shows that many people have believed that main-
taining fundamental values may be worth dying for. Moreover, we can 
also see the compelling power of the raw moral appeal of the child who 
claims that something is "just not fair." One of the elements that make 
negotiation so complex, and not just a mechanical procedure, is that we 
are dealing with individuals who have psychological and emotional needs 
that are intimately linked with their value systems. 
Thus, asking someone to make a commitment to a settlement that he 
or she perceives as unfair, or to accept a procedure she considers unjust, 
is likely to tap into core beliefs about who we are and how we should 
relate to people and situations. This means that while we may personally 
accept or reject the value systems of others, any serious examination of 
negotiation cannot afford to ignore their effects. Ethical issues in negotia-
tion may be approached in a narrow sense that looks at the minimally 
acceptable levels of bargaining behavior. However, we have seen that the 
current movement is to think more seriously about fundamental issues of 
justice and fairness, and in a much wider perspective. 
Notes 
1 There is a considerable literature on the ploys of so-called "hard" bargaining. See 
generally Schartzki and Coffey, Negotiation: The Art of Getting What You Want (1981 ); 
Ringer, Winning Through Intimidation (1974); Gotbaum, Negotiating In the Real World: 
Getting the Deal You Want (1999). Also see [NDR: Craver, Distributive Negotiation] 
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2 See, e.g., Shell, Bargaining for Advantage, 201-234 (contrasting deception to integ-
rity). See generally Murray L. Schwartz, "The Professionalism and Accountability of 
Lawyers," California Law Review, 66 (1978): 669; Walter W. Steele, Jr., "Deceptive 
Negotiating and High-Toned Morality," Vanderbilt Law Review, 39 (1986): 1387; 
Charles B. Craver, "Negotiation Ethics: How to be Deceptive Without Being Dishon-
est/How to be Assertive Without Being Offensive," South Texas Law Review, 39 (1997): 
713; see also Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, 9 ("Let justice be 
done-that is, for my client let justice be done-though the heavens fall."). Note that 
legality remains the benchmark of acceptable behavior, and thus reliance on misrepre-
sented information, for instance, would still be actionable. 
3 In iterated prisoner's dilemmas where one side has defected following a period of 
cooperation, a voluntary working relationship can be reestablished, but typically the 
injured party demands considerable penance; that is, there are costs to the defecting 
party if it wants to interact again with the same partner. See Kevin Gibson, et al., 
"Once Bitten: Defection and Reconciliation in a Cooperative Enterprise," Business 
Ethics Quarterly 9, no. 69 (1999): 75-85. 
4 Akerlof makes the point that if it is known that there is a percentage of duds in a 
given market (e.g., 10% of cars are lemons) then customers will discount what they are 
prepared to pay to compensate for the risk of ending up with one of the duds. This 
implies that parties in a negotiation will lower their substantive offers in relation to 
the possibility of getting taken. Similarly, they will pay more for what they perceive as 
a straight deal. Thus the overall effect of sharp practice is to lower the gains of those 
involved. See George A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, no. 3 (1970): 488-500. 
5 See generally Leigh Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, (Pearson, 
2005). A study at the University of Michigan demonstrated that a good reputation for 
seller on E-bay led to a twelve percent increase in profits. See Catherine Dupree, 
"Integrity has its Price," Harvard Magazine, July-Aug. 2003, available at 
http: I /www.harvardmagazine.com /2003/07 /integrity-has-its-price. html (last visited 
November 25,2015). 
6 This is not to say that individuals cannot combine both intrinsic and instrumental 
approaches. 
7 Williams, Style and Effectiveness in Negotiation, 172-74. Phyllis Beck Kritek makes 
the point well when she says that negotiators need to be aware of their own core 
values but ought not to try to impose them on others lest they are rejected by the 
other bargainers and the dynamic in the negotiation changes to a power struggle over 
the acceptability of that particular set of values. Kritek, Negotiating at an Uneven 
Table, 215. 
8 There is extensive literature on stakeholder theory in business ethics. See Freeman 
and McVea, "A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management," in The Blackwell 
Handbook of Strategic Management, 189. 
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